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Abstract 24 
 Previous research has demonstrated a preference for positive over negative information in 25 
visual search; asking whether a target object is green biases search towards green objects, even 26 
when this entails more perceptual processing than searching non-green objects. The present 27 
study investigated whether this confirmatory search bias is due to the presence of one particular 28 
(e.g., green) color in memory during search. Across two experiments, we show that this is not the 29 
critical factor in generating a confirmation bias in search. Search slowed proportionally to the 30 
number of stimuli whose color matched the color held in memory only when the color was 31 
remembered as part of the search instructions. These results suggest that biased search for 32 
information is due to a particular attentional selection strategy, and not to memory-driven 33 
attentional biases. 34 
Keywords: Visual attention, Working memory, Visual search, Heuristics, Confirmation bias 35 
  36 
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1. Introduction 37 
The environment is full of information, but from moment-to-moment, we only want 38 
answers to particular questions (e.g., is there a car in my blind spot?). Top-down control allows 39 
us to attend to information that pertains to our goals; it allows us to selectively query our 40 
environment (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Bacon & Egeth, 41 
1994). What questions we ask, and how we ask them, can affect what information is processed 42 
and what information is not (Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Simons & Chabris, 1999). Simply asking 43 
whether a target object is green will lead observers to attend to green objects, even when non-44 
green objects provide an equal amount of information about the target’s color (Rajsic, Wilson, & 45 
Pratt, 2015). Thus, top-down visual attention can lead to a sort of confirmation bias (Wason, 46 
1968; Klayman & Ha, 1987) where confirmation occurs faster than disconfirmation. In this 47 
paper, we investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this bias; specifically, whether the 48 
confirmation bias in visual search is an involuntary consequence of holding target information in 49 
memory. 50 
 Given that what we need to know about our environment changes from moment-to-51 
moment, it stands to reason that top-down control depends on some sort of short-term memory 52 
system that maintains the current attentional criteria. Several models of attention have proposed 53 
that memory for attention is enabled by visual working memory (VWM; Luck, 2008), the 54 
memory store used to recognize (Luck & Vogel, 1997) and recall (Wilken & Ma, 2004) recently 55 
seen visual information (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Indeed, a 56 
considerable amount of evidence shows that maintaining a visual feature in memory for a later 57 
test can prioritize processing of objects that possess that feature (Downing, 2000; Soto, Heinke, 58 
Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Olivers, 2009; but see 59 
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Downing & Dodds, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2007). Such findings lead to an interesting 60 
situation; attentional selection that is endogenous (depending on the internal state of the 61 
organism, not properties of its input) but also involuntary (not due to current goals of the 62 
organism). This is not to say that all top-down control is necessarily of this sort. This memory-63 
driven capture effect is subject to cognitive control (Carlisle & Woodman, 2011; Kiyonaga, 64 
Egner, & Soto, 2012), and thus depends on its goal-related utility. Nonetheless, memory-driven 65 
attentional capture presents a simple “null hypothesis” of the degree of intention that should be 66 
attributed to observers’ attentional control state in a given situation: potentially nothing more 67 
than sustaining a memory for relevant information is required for goal-driven selection. 68 
 As noted earlier, a consequence of top-down attention is that information outside of the 69 
attentional set may be missed (Simons & Chabris, 1999; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Recently, we have 70 
shown that this failure can take the form of a confirmation bias: when asked whether a target 71 
object has a particular property or not (e.g., is green or not green), attention is biased towards 72 
objects with this property (Rajsic et al., 2015). To do so, we have used a search task where two 73 
colored variants of a target can appear in search, for example, either a red or a green p among red 74 
and green non-p’s (d, b, and q’s). On every trial, one, and only one, of the two targets is present. 75 
Critically, participants are instructed to report whether the target letter is a particular color or not 76 
(e.g., is the p green or not). This allows one color to provide “positive information” and the other 77 
color to provide “negative information” with respect to the tested proposition (Klayman & Ha, 78 
1987). What we are interested in is whether visual search will exhibit a bias towards positive 79 
information; that is, whether search times will depend on the number of matching colors (i.e., the 80 
number of green letters, in the example given), as search for color-defined targets can be 81 
restricted to color subsets (Egeth, Virzi,& Garbart, 1984; Bacon & Egeth, 1997). Our previous 82 
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investigations (Rajsic et al., 2015; Rajsic, Taylor & Pratt, 2016; Rajsic, Wilson, & Pratt, 2017) 83 
have shown that a bias towards positive information does win out over the alternative strategy of 84 
attending to the smaller color subset (Sobel & Cave, 2002).  85 
 In our previous work, we have suggested that this confirmation bias results from a default 86 
strategy for testing hypotheses, whether perceptual or otherwise, of attending to features of the 87 
positive predictions of a proposition (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Consistent with this, the bias in 88 
search is reduced when searches are made more inefficient (Rajsic et al., 2017) and also when 89 
tested propositions tend to be false (e.g., targets tend to be non-green; Walenchok, Hout, & 90 
Goldinger, 2016). However, in light of the phenomenon of memory-driven attention reviewed 91 
earlier, a simpler explanation may exist. Given that participants need to at least encode, if not 92 
remember, one of the two stimulus colors to make responses in the search task, it is possible that 93 
the bias towards positive information is solely due to the consonance between a color held in 94 
memory (presumably VWM, although a verbal code can produce memory-driven capture as 95 
well: Soto & Humphreys, 2007) and not because of a hypothesis testing strategy. For example, 96 
when asked to report whether a p is green or not, participants may adopt a top-down set for the 97 
smaller color subset (i.e., red or green letters, whichever there are fewer of), but the necessity of 98 
maintaining the feature “green” in working memory to code the temporary stimulus-response 99 
mappings could cause green items to capture attention involuntarily during searches. In the 100 
present paper, we present two experiments testing this alternative explanation for the 101 
confirmation bias. To preview our findings, in both experiments, we find no evidence of 102 
selective search through stimuli whose color matches a color merely held in memory, suggesting 103 
that there is more to confirmatory search than the contents of memory. 104 
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2. Experiment 1 105 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to test the possibility that confirmatory visual search is a 106 
result of one of two colors being held in working memory. To accomplish this, we adapted the 107 
design of Experiment 1 of Rajsic et al., (2015) to contrast the instructional manipulation that we 108 
presume to underlie confirmatory searching (the Positive information condition) with a stimulus-109 
matched version that required similar maintenance of a color in memory (the Working Memory 110 
condition), but did not afford confirmatory searching. 111 
2.1 Methods 112 
 2.1.1 Participants 113 
 Thirty-two undergraduate students enrolled in a first-year Psychology course at the 114 
University of Toronto volunteered for Experiment 1 through an online system. Students did not 115 
know the nature of the study for which they had volunteered until arriving at the lab, at which 116 
point the procedure was explained and informed consent was given. Participants were 117 
compensated for their participation with partial course credit. Half of the participants (n = 16) 118 
participated in the positive information condition, and half participated in the working memory 119 
condition. 120 
 2.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 121 
 Stimuli were presented using 16” CRT monitors on a Dell PCs using Matlab and the 122 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007). Responses were collected with a 123 
standard USB keyboard. The experiment consisted of a series of displays; instruction displays, 124 
that presented participants with search instructions before each block of trials an experimental 125 
session, and trials displays, which comprised individual trials. A schematic depiction of these 126 
displays is presented in Figure 1. 127 
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 128 
Figure 1. 129 
A schematic of the events in Experiment 1. Instructions were presented before each block of 18 130 
trials. Stimuli are not drawn to scale. 131 
 132 
 Before beginning the experiment, the experiment program displayed a written description 133 
of the task, which was closely matched between the two conditions. Both instructions 134 
emphasized that two possible target colors would be used. Participants pressed Enter to move 135 
past this screen, with a minimum 3-second duration. 136 
 Instruction displays for the positive information condition consisted of the instruction 137 
“Press a if the target is this colour: color. Press b if it is not.” printed in the upper left of the 138 
screen. Instruction displays for the working memory condition used the instruction “Press a if the 139 
target is present. Press b if it is not.” For both instruction types, the keys Z and M were used in a 140 
counterbalanced order to stand for responses a and b, and the target letter could be either p, b, d, 141 
or q. For the positive information condition, the color consisted of a small (1° by 1°) square 142 
colored in with the RGB coordinates of the template-matching color used for all subsequent 143 
search displays for that instruction. Instruction displays were presented until the participant 144 
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pressed the Enter key to begin the experiment, with a minimum 1-second duration to ensure the 145 
instructions were not skipped by accident. 146 
 Each trial began with a fixation display, for 2000ms, consisting of a white + symbol, 147 
subtending 0.8° by 0.8°, on a dark grey background. The search display followed, with an 148 
identical fixation mark and 8 search letters (p, d, b, and q), positioned evenly around the 149 
circumference of an imaginary circle, radius 8°, centered on fixation. The letters subtended 150 
approximately 0.8° in width and 1.2° in height and were printed in Arial font.  151 
 On Target Present trials, one of the letters was the target letter, and the other seven 152 
distractor letters were chosen from the three remaining letters, randomly sampled with 153 
replacement. On color-matching trials, the target appeared in the color presented during the 154 
instructions. On color-mismatching trials, the target appeared in the color not presented during 155 
the instructions. On Target Absent trials, all distractors were selected from the three non-target 156 
letters.  157 
 The colors of the search stimuli were also manipulated in three levels, orthogonally to the 158 
target present factor. Before each search instruction display, two colors were selected to be used 159 
for a search block: one color to be presented in the instruction and one that would not, from a 160 
pool of seven colors (purple, yellow, green, orange, pink, blue, and red; see Rajsic et al., 2015 161 
for RGB values). Either two, four, or six of the letters were colored using the color presented in 162 
the instructions, with the remaining letters colored in the color not presented. The search display 163 
was presented until a response was provided, using the Z or M keys. Once a response had been 164 
given, a feedback display appeared, with the word “Correct!” or “Incorrect” displayed at the 165 
center of the screen. This display lasted for 2000ms. In the working memory condition only, a 166 
memory test display followed this feedback screen. The memory test screen presented a single 167 
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colored square, 1° by 1°, whose color either matched the remembered color or did not (i.e., it 168 
was selected from one of the six non-remembered colors). A memory response prompt was 169 
presented 12° above fixation, asking “Is this the colour that you had to remember? Z = yes, M = 170 
No.”, centered horizontally. On half of the trials, the color matched the remembered color, and 171 
on half it did not. After a response was provided, the next trial began immediately. 172 
 Participants completed 16 blocks of 18 trials, where each block began with a new 173 
instruction screen. Within a block, the 18 trials were composed of an equal distribution of the 174 
three target present conditions and the three template color match conditions (i.e., 3 trials of 175 
each) in a random order. 176 
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2.2 Results 177 
 Our primary unit of interest was correct response time for each condition. Trials were 178 
selected for inclusion as long as responses were correct, and as long as response times were not 179 
greater or less than three standard deviations from each participant’s average correct response 180 
time. For the working memory condition, an additional constraint was added: memory responses 181 
at the end of the trial needed to be correct. In addition, three participants from both conditions 182 
were excluded for having an overall accuracy of less than 75% (statistical results were similar 183 
without these participants’ exclusion). In the positive information condition, 10.6% of trials, on 184 
average, were excluded due to incorrect search responses and 1.6% of trials, on average, were 185 
excluded for slow responses. In the working memory condition, 11.7% of trials, on average, 186 
were excluded due to incorrect search responses, 1.1% of trials were excluded due to slow 187 
responses, and 2.8% of trials were excluded due to incorrect memory responses. Overall, 11.7% 188 
of trials were excluded in the positive information condition and 15.1% of trials were excluded in 189 
the working memory condition.  190 
Mean correct response times were calculated for each cell of our design: Target Presence 191 
(color matching, color mismatching, target absent) by Color Subset (2 matching, 4 matching, or 192 
6 matching), and analysed with a 3 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA, with the instruction condition 193 
included as a between-subjects factor. Search bias, as assessed by the color subset factor, 194 
differed by search instruction, F(2, 48) = 39.15, p < .001, η2p = .62, as did the target presence 195 
effect, F(2, 48) =29.59, p < .001, η2p = .55, and their interaction, F(4, 96) = 9.55, p < .001, η2p = 196 
.29. 197 
 As can be seen in Figure 2, search under the positive information instructions closely 198 
resembled a serial search for targets matching the color held in memory: the target absent (M = 199 
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233ms, SE = 27ms) and color mismatching search slopes (M = 248ms, SE = 27ms) were 200 
approximately double those of color matching search slopes (M = 75ms, SE = 19ms). In contrast, 201 
in the working memory condition, search slopes were considerably flatter (Mmatch = 16ms, SEmatch 202 
= 19ms, Mmismatch = 10ms, SEmismatch = 27ms, Mtarg absent = -20ms, SEtarg absent = 27ms). For both 203 
instruction conditions, however, color matching targets were reported faster than color 204 
mismatching targets. When targets matched the color in the search instructions, color matching 205 
targets were reported faster, M = 1709ms, SE = 157ms, than color mismatching targets, M = 206 
2075ms, SE = 232ms, F(1, 12) = 15.183, p = .002, η2p = .56. When colors were simply held in 207 
memory, memory matching targets were still reported faster, M = 1959ms, SE = 146ms, than 208 
memory mismatching targets, M = 2124ms, SE = 135ms, F(1, 12) = 10.01, p = .008, η2p = .46. 209 
 210 
Figure 2. Search performance in Experiment 1 as a function of instruction type (left and right 211 
panels), target type, and color subset size. Error bars depict one within-subjects standard error 212 
(Cousineau, 2005). 213 
 214 
2.3 Discussion 215 
 Overall, the results of Experiment 1 show that confirmatory search patterns are not 216 
simply a function of having to maintain a particular visual feature in memory during search. 217 
Search slopes over the memory-matching color subset were considerably steeper when 218 
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participants were asked to report the presence of a particular colored target than when they were 219 
asked to search for a particular target while holding a color in memory. However, targets 220 
matching the color held in memory (for the search task, or merely during the search task) were 221 
reported faster in both cases. Nonetheless, the results clearly support the conclusion that a search 222 
setting requires more than a particular color being stored in memory. 223 
3. Experiment 2 224 
 Although the results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that confirmatory search patterns are 225 
unlikely to be due simply to a color being stored in memory, the inclusion of target absent trials 226 
could have compromised our measure of the extent of the subset slope difference. In our original 227 
experiments (Rajsic et al., 2015), the target letter was always present. This was a very important 228 
design implementation, as it allowed for the existence of negative information (i.e., information 229 
that could negate one perceptual hypothesis). By including target absent trials in Experiment 1, 230 
this considerably reduced the utility of negative information; while it was true that finding a 231 
color mismatching target allowed the correct inference that a color matching target was not 232 
present, failing to find a given target did not allow for the inference that the other target was 233 
present. For this reason, the search strategy observed in our positive information condition in 234 
Experiment 1 cannot be clearly deemed a bias; a correct “yes” response can only be given by 235 
encountering a matching target, making a bias towards this color reasonable. 236 
 In Experiment 2, we modified the design of Experiment 1 so that only target-present 237 
trials were used, as in our previous work (Rajsic et al., 2015). For the working memory 238 
condition, participants discriminated the hemifield (left or right) that the target appeared in. As in 239 
Experiment 1, if confirmatory search patterns are simply due to the maintenance of a particular 240 
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color in working memory, we should observe a matching-subset search slope in both the positive 241 
information and working memory conditions. 242 
3.1 Methods 243 
 3.1.1 Participants 244 
 Twenty-four undergraduates enrolled in a first-year Psychology class at the University of 245 
Toronto participated in Experiment 2. None of the participants in Experiment 2 had participated 246 
in Experiment 1. Half of the participants (12) participated in the positive information condition, 247 
and the other half participated in the working memory condition. All participants gave informed 248 
consent before participating. 249 
 3.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 250 
 The apparatus used in Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1. The 251 
stimuli as well were identical with the following exceptions: the instructions of Experiment 2 252 
were changed to reflect the new task, emphasizing the fact that the target letter would always be 253 
present in the display. In addition, before each block of trials, search instructions were given as 254 
“Press a if the target is this colour: color. Press b if it is not.” for the positive information 255 
condition, and “Press Z if the target is on the left. Press M if it is not” for the working memory 256 
condition. The trials were also adjusted by removing all target absent trials. As such, the number 257 
of trials was reduced (16 blocks of 12 trials).  Finally, to allow all targets to be reported as being 258 
on the left or right in the WM condition, stimulus positions were rotated by 22.5° (around 259 
fixation), such that all stimuli appeared in either the left or right hemifield. 260 
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3.2 Results 261 
 Trials for analysis were selected using the same procedure as Experiment 1; only trials 262 
with accurate responses and responses that fell within three standard deviations of participants’ 263 
respective mean correct response time were included. For the positive information condition, this 264 
led to the exclusion of 12.3% of trials on average per person, comprising 1.9% slow responses 265 
and 11.1% search errors, and 10.5% of trials on average per person in the working memory 266 
condition, comprising 1.0% slow responses, 4.6% search errors, and 5.4% memory errors. The 267 
resulting search data are plotted in Figure 3. 268 
 269 
Figure 3. Search performance in Experiment 2 as a function of instruction type (left and right 270 
panels), target type, and color subset size. Error bars depict one within-subjects standard error 271 
(Cousineau, 2005). 272 
 273 
 As in Experiment 1, our critical interest was in whether the subset slopes differed 274 
between the two conditions. A mixed-model ANOVA showed an interaction between search 275 
condition and color matching subset size, F(2, 44) = 5.11, p = .01, η2p = .19. For the positive 276 
information condition, search slopes were steep, but near parallel (Mcolor matching = 63ms, SEcolor 277 
matching = 14ms, Mcolor mismatching = 84ms, SEcolor matching = 22ms). In the working memory condition, 278 
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slopes were considerably less steep, F(1, 22) = 9.86, p = .005, η2p = .31, (Mcolor matching = 8ms, 279 
SEcolor matching = 14ms, Mcolor mismatching = 34ms, SEcolor matching = 22ms).  280 
Despite the lack of a strong bias towards color-matching stimuli in the working memory 281 
condition, we nonetheless observed an advantage in response time for matching-targets, M = 282 
1538ms, SE = 72ms, over mismatching targets, M = 1766ms, SE = 105ms, F(1, 11) = 11.34, p = 283 
.006, η2p = .51.  284 
3.3 Discussion 285 
 Experiment 2 demonstrated that, in a search for targets that were always present, 286 
confirmatory search emerged when one color was framed as positive information, but not when 287 
that same color was simply held in memory. Only in the former condition did search slopes 288 
clearly indicate a selection of matching-colored search items. However, in both conditions, we 289 
observed an overall advantage in the speed of reporting a memory-matching target.  290 
4. General Discussion 291 
 The goal of the present investigation was to determine whether confirmatory visual 292 
search occurs because of the need to maintain particular visual information in memory. Given 293 
that asking whether a target object has a particular property (e.g., greenness) requires 294 
remembering the property in question (green), this memory representation alone could lead to 295 
confirmatory search patterns if it involuntarily drove attention to matching visual information 296 
(Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; Soto & Humphreys, 2007). Across two 297 
experiments, we showed that this is not the case. With identical search displays, searches were 298 
biased to particular colored stimuli only when searchers were asked about whether a target had a 299 
particular feature (the positive information condition), but not when they were asked to search 300 
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for a target while remembering that same feature (the working memory condition). These results 301 
show that confirmatory search is not simply due to feature-priming (see also Rajsic et al., 2016).  302 
One noteworthy observation from the present experiments is that while a search slope 303 
over feature-matching stimuli occurred only in the positive information condition, both 304 
conditions showed a response-time benefit when the target possessed the feature maintained in 305 
memory. We take this to reflect the involvement of features held in memory in the target 306 
recognition stage of search, but not in the guidance stage. Recent evidence shows that variations 307 
in the precision, category, and prevalence of target types can affect both guidance and the speed 308 
of recognition (Hout & Goldinger, 2015; Hout, et al., 2017; Hout, Walenchok, Goldinger, & 309 
Wolfe, 2015). Repetition benefits for conjunction targets and distractor context also seem to 310 
largely produce intercept, not slope, changes in visual search (Kristjánsson, Wang, & Nakayama, 311 
2002; Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2007; but see Becker & Horstmann, 2009). 312 
Interpreted through the lens of a two-stage search theory, like Guided Search 4.0 (Wolfe, 2007), 313 
our results suggest that, at least in our task, activating a feature in working memory affects the 314 
speed of object recognition, either by lowering a “target” threshold for objects possessing 315 
features in working memory, or by increasing the rate of “target” evidence accrual for object 316 
whose features match those in working memory; our experiments were not designed to provide 317 
the detailed speed-accuracy data needed to tease these two possibilities apart. Importantly, our 318 
data suggest that settings of the guidance system are, appropriately, related to the search task and 319 
not the contents of memory. Even memory-driven capture effects are affected by task-demands 320 
(Carlisle & Woodman, 2011; Olivers & Eimer, 2011; Dalvit & Eimer, 2011; Kiyonaga, Egner, & 321 
Soto, 2012), demonstrating that the information currently held in memory is only part of the 322 
process of allocating visual attention (if at all: Woodman, Carlisle, & Reinhart, 2013).  323 
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 It thus seems clear that there is more to the guidance of attention than information 324 
maintained in memory: but what else is involved? Given that working memory representations 325 
are considered to be the format shared by many cognitive operations (Luck, 2008), there must be 326 
additional states or processes that code the current function, or use, of the information 327 
maintained in memory. Indeed, this would mirror the way we talk about these cognitive activities 328 
(e.g., I can search for red or for green objects, and I can also list foods I know of that are red or 329 
green). Oberauer (2010) referred to this second set of functions as procedural working memory, 330 
and suggests that cognitive actions are the result of cognitive bindings between the content (red) 331 
and the conduct (look-for), both maintained in short term memory stores. This proposal would 332 
make similar predictions to the “special status” proposal of Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, and 333 
Roelfsema (2011), who proposed that only one working memory representation can guide 334 
attention at a time, if it were the case that only one binding could be maintained. However, 335 
available empirical evidence suggests that the one-item limit is not always observed (Beck, 336 
Hollingworth, & Luck, 2012; Hollingworth & Beck, 2016), though it is not clear whether 337 
multiple-feature templates should be considered one or several templates (Huang & Pashler, 338 
2007). We suggest, along with Irons and Leber (2016), that the relative utility of different 339 
attentional guidance strategies may be critical in resolving these issues.  340 
 To be clear, although our results show that maintenance of a color in memory is not 341 
sufficient to induce a visual confirmation bias, active working memory representations might 342 
nonetheless be the source of the bias when memories are relevant to search (i.e., when they are 343 
involved in maintaining features of the search instructions). We follow previous researchers in 344 
suggesting that voluntary attentional guidance requires additional cognitive processes (Olivers & 345 
Eimer, 2011; Carlisle & Woodman, 2011). A recent discussion of internal attention by Myers, 346 
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Stokes, and Nobre (2017) provides a useful perspective on this issue by highlighting how an 347 
“attended memory” may be better thought of in terms of reformatting a memory to prepare for 348 
particular tasks and actions. They suggest that the difference between remembering several 349 
colors for a memory test and focusing one of those colors that has been cued as likely to be 350 
tested may be a change in the temporary mappings between representations of remembered 351 
colors and potential responses (same/different from any color, same/different from cued color). 352 
Our results are quite compatible with this line of reasoning; this is, after all, our primary 353 
manipulation. Similar manipulations of remembering versus implementing instructions during a 354 
stimulus-response task have revealed considerable neural differences between these two 355 
cognitive states, both in terms of regions associated with control (e.g., lateral prefrontal and 356 
parietal cortices) and regions associated with stimulus coding (e.g., visual areas, such as the 357 
fusiform face area; Muhle-Karbe, Duncan, De Baene, Mitchell, & Brass, 2016). We suggest that 358 
top-down guidance of visual attention may be a special case of this broader class of memory-359 
action couplings. 360 
 In referring to the search patterns we have observed as a “confirmation bias”, we are 361 
suggesting that participants’ lack of flexible subset selection in our task amounts to a failure to 362 
actively entertain alternative perceptual hypotheses (Kunda, 1990; Koehler, 1991; Mynatt, 363 
Doherty, & Dragan, 1993; Buttaccio, Lange, Thomas, & Dougherty, 2015). Ruling out a simple 364 
memory-driven attentional bias explanation provides some support to this interpretation. As 365 
such, we consider our results to be indicative of the cognitive strategies participants employ in 366 
visual search, and, perhaps too, other forms of visual reasoning. The notion that confirmatory 367 
searches are a simple, default method of querying visual data is congruent with research on 368 
sentence-picture comparisons, where verifying that a previously presented sentence described a 369 
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picture tends to be faster than denying the match (Clark & Chase, 1972; but see Underwood, 370 
Jebbett, & Roberts, 2004) as well as recent work on the interpretation of graphical data 371 
representations by Michal and colleagues (Michal, Uttal, Shah, & Franconeri, 2016), which 372 
shows a tendency to inspect graphs in the order suggested by a question.  373 
 To conclude, the present study shows that the confirmation bias in search is not the result 374 
simply of the contents of memory. We suggest instead that it reflects an information search 375 
strategy (i.e., template-matching) that allows for a cognitively economical solution to visual 376 
hypothesis testing.  377 
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